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| INTRODUCTION
Four levels of the overall health care delivery enterprise are shown in Figure 1 . 1, 2 This framework provides a conceptual model for understanding relationships among the various elements of this enterprise, ranging from patient-clinician interactions at the bottom to policy and budget decisions by Congress and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) at the top. In the middle, providers and payers make investment decisions that balance the patients' needs from below and the "rules of the game" from above.
Note that "medicine" is delivered on the bottom level of this figure. Additional functions associated with health care delivery occur on the other 3 levels. To foster high-value health for everyone, learning
has to occur at all of the levels.
This enterprise is being challenged by needs for fundamental change. The Affordable Care Act, evolving payment schemes, and market and technology opportunities and threats have resulted in an enormous number of initiatives at all levels of the enterprise.
Orchestrating these initiatives is very much complicated by the complex adaptive nature of the health care system. 3 Put simply, there are millions of independent agents reacting to the forces driving change.
All of these agents are rapidly learning in the process, but the enterprise as a whole is learning much more slowly. This paper addresses this mismatch.
We begin by considering the construct of enterprise transformation. This construct is defined. A framework for transformation is pre- examples are used to illustrate this distinction-cancer, population health, and health IT. This leads to a discussion of 4 strategies that the health care delivery enterprise can use to more effectively learn at all levels of the enterprise. We conclude with a discussion of important research issues that need to be addressed.
This article integrates several analytic frameworks that were initially developed in other industries. This raises the question of whether health care is substantially different from other industries. In particular, health care delivery is highly fragmented, much like retail was before the consumer product companies and the big box retailers consolidated the industry over the past few decades.
However, the health care industry has in recent years exhibited more mergers and acquisitions than any other segment of the economy. Integration into large health systems is proceeding briskly. 1, 2 This has enabled adoption of best practices from other industries, eg, integrated supply chain management.
We have found several analytic frameworks and methods that work well across industries ranging from health care to automotive, aerospace, retail, and telecommunications. 4 Comparisons across industries can provide valuable benchmarks that can augment within-industry comparisons, for example, across health care providers. 5 Finally, an overarching theme of this paper is captured by the results of an informal survey of a large number of top executives. They were asked 1 question. "What single issue keeps you awake at night?"
The most common response was, "Running the enterprise I have while trying to create the enterprise I want." This is what motivates our desire to understand learning in the health care enterprise.
| TRANSFORMING THE ENTERPRISE
It has been suggested that transforming health care delivery is akin to rewiring a building while the power is on. How can we design and develop a transformed system while also avoiding operational deficiencies or unintended consequences in the process? To address this question, we need a deeper understanding of the notion of enterprise transformation.
Our earlier studies 6, 7 have led us to formulate a qualitative theory, "Enterprise transformation is driven by experienced and/or anticipated value deficiencies that result in significantly redesigned and/or new work processes as determined by management's decision making abilities, limitations, and inclinations, all in the context of the social networks of management in particular and the enterprise in general."
There is a wide range of ways to pursue transformation. Figure 2 summarizes conclusions drawn from a large number of case studies.
The ends of transformation can range from greater cost efficiencies, to enhanced market perceptions, to new product and service offerings, and to fundamental changes of markets. The means can range from upgrading people's skills, to redesigning business practices, to significant infusions of technology, and to fundamental changes of strategy.
The scope of transformation can range from work activities, to business functions, to overall organizations, and to the enterprise as a whole.
The framework in Figure 2 has provided a useful categorization of a broad range of case studies of enterprise transformation. Considering transformation of markets, Amazon leveraged IT to redefine book buying, while Wal-Mart leveraged IT to redefine the retail industry.
In these 2 instances at least, it can be argued that Amazon and WalMart just grew; they did not transform. Nevertheless, their markets were transformed.
Illustrations of transformation of offerings include UPS moving from being a package delivery company to a global supply chain management provider, IBM's transition from manufacturing to services, Motorola moving from battery eliminators to radios to cell phones, Rubbermaid resuscitating numerous home products companies, and
Interface adopting green business practices.
The costs and risks of transformation increase as the endeavor moves farther from the center in Figure 2 . Initiatives focused on the center will typically involve well-known and mature methods and tools from industrial engineering and operations management. In contrast, initiatives towards the perimeter will often require substantial changes of products, services, channels, etc, as well as associated large investments.
It is important to note that successful transformations in the outer band of Figure 2 are likely to require significant investments in the inner bands also. In general, any level of transformation requires consideration of all subordinate levels. Thus, for example, successfully changing the market's perceptions of an enterprise's offerings is likely to also require enhanced operational excellence to underpin the new image being sought. As another illustration, significant changes of strategies often require new processes for decision making, eg, for R&D investments.
The transformation framework can be applied to thinking through a range of scenarios for health care delivery. The inner circle in Figure 2 focuses on provider efficiency by, for example, focusing on particular activities, the skills needed for these activities, and the costs of these activities. In contrast, the outer circle of Figure 2 might focus on population health (discussed later), addressing the whole enterprise, rethinking strategy, and fundamentally changing the health care marketplace.
Changes in the outer circle will very likely require changes in the adjacent circle. New offerings in a range of organizations will be enabled by new technologies. Success of these offerings is likely to involve changes of perceptions in the next circle at the functional level, enabled by new processes. Thus, we can see that moving to population health will require reconsideration of everything the enterprise does.
This does not imply that everything will change. Instead, it means that everything needs to be considered in terms of how things consistently fit together, function smoothly, and provide high-value outcomes. This may be daunting but is entirely feasible. The key point is that one cannot consider transforming health without considering how the delivery enterprise itself should be transformed.
We hasten to note that, at this point, we are only addressing what is likely to have to change, not how the changes can be accomplished.
In particular, we are not considering how to gain the support of stakeholders, manage their perceptions and expectations, and sustain fundamental change.
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3 | ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
| Production learning
Learning is a powerful source of productivity growth. As organizations produce more of a product, the unit cost of production typically decreases. Such a phenomenon is commonly referred to as a learning curve, a progress curve, an experience curve, or learning by doing.
Wright 10 reported production learning curves for airframe production that illustrated unit labor costs declining with cumulative output.
Learning curves have been documented in many organizations, both in the manufacturing and service sectors. 11 However, the rate at which organizations learn can vary greatly from those with minimal or no learning to those with impressive productivity growth. Labor intensive organizations such as health care, education, and government have difficulty achieving the learning rates such as those seen for airplane, automobile, and semiconductor production where technology facilitates learning. Processes are a set of logically related tasks that are performed to achieve a defined outcome. Historically, process redesign was intended to streamline procedures and eliminate obvious bottlenecks and inefficiencies. More recently, particularly in the 1990s, processoriented thinking has been applied to a variety of functions, ranging from information technology infrastructures 15, 16 to new product planning. 17 
| Decision-making learning
The focus on making better decisions has been a central concern of decision theory for many decades. According to Amit and Shoemaker, 18 "For managers, the challenge is to identify, develop, protect, and deploy resources and capabilities in a way that provides the firm with a sustainable competitive advantage and, thereby, a superior return on capital."
They note that managerial decisions involving resources and capabilities are often laced with uncertainty, complexity, and organizational conflict. This can make it difficult to identify the "best" decision.
Simon's "satisficing" is often the only viable approach.
19
A related concept is policy learning, 20 which address the ways that policy systems create and use knowledge about the motivations, design, operation, and impacts of policies and policy mixes. Policy learning requires organizational capabilities to appropriately frame issues and trade-offs in terms of problems and solutions, while taking a holistic view and anticipating future needs.
| Theories of learning
Learning has, of course, long been a topic of study, with emphasis on education, training, and, more recently, organizational development and change. Classically, organizational learning has been regarded as routine based, history dependent, and target oriented. 21 Routinebased organizational learning can be extremely powerful when the learning is guided by clear short-term feedback. 22 The nature of routines, the development of effective routines, and how they change over time are key elements.
Organizational actions are history dependent in that prior knowledge enables the assimilation of new knowledge. 23 Two features of absorptive capacity-cumulativeness and expectation formationenable this historical dependency. Organizations with higher levels of absorptive capacity will be more likely to exploit opportunities present in the environment not solely based on current performance measurements. Organizations with mild absorptive capacity will be reactive and find that they are often responding to failure.
It has been observed that organizations are target oriented, 24, 25 with success dependent on the relationship between the target and actual performance outcomes. It is important to note that targets change over time as measures of success are modified, particularly in response to market and technology opportunities and threats.
Most theories of organizational learning are based on the observations of individual learning. 26, 27 Organizational learning is a dynamic process, based on knowledge flowing across different levels. 28 A study focused on the communication of the results of leaning across units and levels found that organizational learning across levels is more relevant for organizational performance than either individual or group learning. 29 Senge argues that "system thinking" is a core competency of a learning organization, with system dynamics modeling as a central enabling tool. 26 Caldwell 30 
| Machine learning
In this era of large data sets and powerful computing, it is useful to consider machine learning. Valiant 34 provides an analysis of the properties of machine learning. His recent book 35 addresses adaptive computations, which he terms "ecorithms." Ecorithms are algorithms that derive their power by learning from whatever environment they inhabit to be able to behave effectively within it. If there are good mathematical rules for predicting the process of transforming this information into knowledge, Valiant terms the process "theoryful"
and everything else as "theoryless." For both cases, whether the entity involved is a computer or not, the core of making this transformation is learning. While space does not allow a more detailed discussion of these ideas, it does suggest the possibility that humans need not be the only agents of learning in the health care enterprise.
| SINGLE-LOOP AND DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING
Chris Argyris has articulated the notions of single-loop and doubleloop learning. " [A] thermostat that automatically turns on the heat whenever the temperature in a room drops below 68°F is a good example of single-loop learning. A thermostat that could ask, 'why am I set to 68°F?' and then explore whether or not some other temperature might more economically achieve the goal of heating the room would be engaged in double-loop learning." 36 Single-loop learning uses given goals and decision-making rules to improve performance outcomes. Double-loop learning entails the modification of goals or decision-making rules in the light of experience to achieve better outcomes-which may be different outcomes.
Thus, double-loop learning recognizes that the ways in which problems are defined and solved can, in themselves, be sources of problems.
This does not imply that double-loop learning should be preferred, with single-loop learning inherently being inferior. Instead, we should heed Peter Drucker's sage advice, "There is nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency something that should not be done at all." 37 In other words, first, make sure you are doing the right things; then focus on doing them right.
Of course, it would be impractical and likely incorrect to reconsider everything, eg, continually question every medical practice.
Single-loop learning should enable continually improving every practice. When it is found that performance goals cannot be achieved in this way, then double-loop learning is likely warranted. In other words, the ways in which problems of interest are being defined and solved should be questioned. Table 1 
| THREE EXAMPLES
This section elaborates 3 very specific examples of the differences between single-loop and double-loop learning. The first focuses on understanding and treatment of cancer. The second addresses population health, as contrasted with accountable care organizations (ACOs).
The third considers big data and health IT.
| Example no. 1: cancer
The evolution of understanding and treatment of cancer provides good examples of single-loop vs double-loop learning. 42 The progression of the radical mastectomy provides a vivid example of single-loop learning. A half million women in the United States with breast cancer endured the horrors of radical mastectomy, "an extraordinarily morbid, disfiguring procedure in which surgeons removed the breast, the pectoral muscles, the axillary nodes, the chest wall and occasionally the ribs, parts of the sternum, the clavicle and the lymph nodes inside the chest" before it was determined that the procedure provided no medical benefits.
Mukherjee 43 provides a broad view of how cancer had been seen. 
| Example no. 2: population health
As defined by the CMS, an ACO is a "group of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to their Medicare patients." If they can reduce the costs of care for these patients, relative to a defined baseline, they can earn a share of the savings if they satisfy a range of quality metrics. The CMS 47 defines a shared savings and losses and assignment methodology in great detail. A key point is that the baseline is redefined each year, making earning the bonuses increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, the percentage of Americans having access to 1 or more ACOs has steadily increased, 48 despite serious questions on the economic efficacy of the program. 49 The ACO program provides an incentive for a coordinated effort of care for patients-less duplicative and/or unnecessary exams, tests, etc. In 2011, Medicare made almost no payments to providers through alternative payment models. However, we are slowly shifting from volume-based fee for services to payment schemes based on value.
In January 2015, Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of the US Department of
Health and Human Services, announced the goal of having 85% of all Medicare fee-for-service payments tied to quality or value by 2016
and 90% by 2018 with 30% and 50% achieved through alternative payment models, respectively.
50
Fee-for-service ACOs represent single-loop learning in that providers attempt to streamline and tune their processes to incrementally reduce costs while not sacrificing quality. In contrast, population health, in its fullest sense, provides a broad vision for a healthy and educated population. 51 This will require double-loop learning across a variety of businesses and agencies.
Population health has been defined as "the health outcomes of a group of individuals, including the distribution of such outcomes within the group". 52 The concept of population health signifies a change in improvement at the individual level to one that is focused on improving the health of an entire targeted human population. One of the biggest priorities in achieving the shift to population health is reducing health disparities among different population groups due in large part to social determinants of health.
53
Societal health is more than the absence of disease and is created through the conditions and collective actions of our daily lives. It goes beyond health care to look at social, financial, and other factors that influence health. Social determinants of health are conditions in the social, environmental, cultural, and physical environment in which people are born, live, work, and age.
In the United States, it has been found that social factors including education, racial segregation, social supports, and poverty accounted for over a third of total deaths in 1 year. 54 The United States experiences a direct relation between increased premature deaths as income goes down. Similarly, lower levels of education are directly related to lower income as well as a greater likelihood of smoking and shorter life expectancy.
55,56
The identification and awareness of such differences amongst populations regarding health outcomes and determinants are critical in reducing disparities and achieving health equity through a system of broad-based population health. Much research has shown a great disparity in the access as well as quality of care based on geographic location. Such variation amongst states and health care regions extends further to include fundamental measures such as having health insurance or a connection to a regular source of care such as a primary physician. 57 Accountable care organizations and hospitals, as a coalition, could take on very important roles in population health, although they alone are not likely to have the incentives or capabilities to effect the fundamental changes that population health implies. 58 Academic health centers can play a major role but are unlikely to be able to deliver the full range of services. 59, 60 The coordination and delivery of the needed range of services will be a challenge. Double-loop learning will be needed to understand and make sense of the highly fragmented system that delivers health care, education, and social services.
| Example no. 3: big data and health IT
This example builds on the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) vision in Figure 3 . 61, 62 The aspirations portrayed in this diagram represent important advances in evidence-based health care delivery. Much of this will be single-loop learning, ie, getting existing processes to work together seamlessly.
However, single-loop learning within each health IT domain will not be sufficient to realize the ONC vision.
Double-loop learning across domains, organizations, and political and legal jurisdictions will be required to enable this vision. Doubleloop learning should address overall processes across this spectrum, while also more creatively using the wealth of data generated by the system every day. There are 2 particularly important aspects of this.
William Stead 63 observes, "The healthcare industry targets quality improvement at failure points in care processes as they are identified."
However, "A care process must work flawlessly end-to-end to improve quality sufficiently to reduce the amount of care needed and the cost of the system." In other words, we need to improve overall processes not just steps of processes. Reengineering of processes usually involves double-loop learning.
Second, we need to learn how to glean evidence-based findings from the data flows in Figure 3 , rather than solely relying on randomized controlled trials as the "gold standard" for evidence. The logic that led to randomized controlled trials makes good sense. 64 However, it is an expensive and slow way to learn. Further, such trials are typically conducted with cohorts that are not representative of real patient populations, especially for older patients. Thus, results are difficult to extrapolate and scale to real populations.
We need to take advantage of the vast amount of clinical, claims, and financial data generated from everyday patient care, as well as nonhealth data sources such as social media. For example, Bohnsack 65 argues, "By combining historical claim information with demographic and social data, healthcare organizations can build a model that will segment a covered population based on risk. In a zip code where
Health IT vision of a learning health system 61, 62 individuals have a predisposition to diabetes, it is possible to alter the prevention model. By providing educational services, free testing, and easy-to-access preventative care, diabetes can be better managed.
Areas that do not meet that criterion will not require such an investment."
| LEARNING STRATEGIES
Enterprises have differing abilities to predict their futures, as well as differing abilities to respond to these futures. What strategies might enterprise decision makers adopt to address alternative futures? As shown in Figure 4 , we have found that there are 4 basic strategies that decision makers can use: optimize, adapt, hedge, and accept.
If the phenomena of interest are highly predictable, then there is little chance that the enterprise will be pushed into unanticipated territory. Consequently, it is in the best interest of the enterprise to optimize its interventions to be as efficient as possible. In other words, if the unexpected cannot happen, then there is no reason to expend resources beyond process refinement and improvement.
If the phenomena of interest are not highly predictable, but interventions can be appropriately adapted when necessary, it may be in the best interest for the enterprise to plan to adapt. For example, agile capacities can be designed to enable their use in multiple ways, to adapt to changing demands. In this case, some efficiency has been traded for the ability to adapt.
For this approach to work, the enterprise must be able to identify and respond to potential issues faster than the ecosystem changes. If the phenomena of interest are totally unpredictable and there is no viable way to respond, then the enterprise has no choice but to accept the risk. Accept is not so much a strategy as a default condition.
If one is attempting to address a strategic challenge where there is little ability to optimize the efficacy of offerings, limited ability to adapt offerings, and no viable hedges against the uncertainties associated FIGURE 4 Strategy framework for enterprise decision makers 66 with these offerings, the enterprise must accept the conditions that emerge. Learning is still possible, however, as outlined below. In contrast, the enterprise might develop scenarios of a range of potential futures, devise hedges for each of these futures, and invest in a portfolio of options. Not all of these futures would happen, so not all options would be exercised, but the enterprise would be prepared for almost any possibility. Interestingly, the options not exercised can sometimes be licensed to other enterprises where the option has value in their markets. 39 The examples for the accept strategy focus on broad trends that the enterprise has to address but can only affect in a limited way.
Single-loop learning focuses on tracking these trends and projecting their primary impacts. Double-loop learning would attempt to get ahead of these trends by developing causal models of the forces behind these trends. This would be particularly valuable for population health, for example, where understanding these forces might provide insights into new service line offerings needed.
There is another possibility that deserves mention-stay with the status quo. Yu, Rouse, and Serban 67 developed a computational theory of enterprise transformation, elaborating on the qualitative theory presented earlier in this paper. 6, 7 They used this computational theory to assess when investing in change is attractive and unattractive.
Investing in transformation is likely to be attractive when one is currently underperforming and the circumstances are such that investments will likely improve enterprise performance. In contrast, if one is already performing well, investments in change will be difficult to justify. Similarly, if performance cannot be predictably improvedbecause of noisy markets and/or highly discriminating customersthen investments may not be warranted despite current underperformance. Consequently, double-loop learning can be an unattractive investment.
Health care delivery is currently a very noisy market. Executives have told us that their biggest concern is uncertainty about the payment system in the United States. When will fee for service disappear?
How will payment for outcomes be implemented? How will ACO, patient-centered medical homes, and population health evolve and be financed? These uncertainties make investment decision making difficult and suggest that a bit of "wait and see" might be justified.
| CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered learning in the context of the transformation of the health care delivery enterprise. A framework for transformation was presented and elaborated in the context of health care delivery.
We reviewed what is known about organizational learning, with particular emphasis on single-loop versus double-loop learning.
Three health care examples were used to illustrate this distinction -cancer, population health, and health IT. This led to a discussion of 4 strategies that the health care delivery enterprise can use to more effectively learn at all levels of the enterprise.
This overall line of reasoning suggests several important research issues. First, as articulated in Figure 1 , the health care delivery enterprise involves much more than providers and payers. The ecosystem includes many issues beyond treating disease and paying for it. We need to improve our methods and tools for addressing the overall enterprise.
Research is also needed on better means for portraying consequences of decisions to the full range of stakeholders in the enterprise.
Healthy people are more able to contribute to society, including working and paying taxes. Thus, investments in health yield significant returns, and the lowest cost health care delivery enterprise is very unlikely to yield the greatest returns.
Broader yet, an educated population will be a healthier population.
Thus, population health cannot ignore education. In general, the overall goal should be a healthy, educated, and productive population that is competitive in the global marketplace. We need to better understand the available levers for achieving this goal and how to best portray the intricacies of the overall enterprise to motivate those who can pull these levers to do so.
